The deontic logic DUS is a Deontic update semantics for prescriptive obligations based on the update semantics of Veltman. In ous the definition of logical validity of obligations is not based on static truth values but on dynamic action transitions. In this paper prescriptive defeasible obligations are formalized in update semantics and the diagnostic problem of defeasible deon tic logic is discussed. Assume a defeasible obli gation 'normally a ought to be (done)' together with the fact ' -,a is (done).' Is this an exception of the normality claim, or is it a violation of the obligation? In this paper we formalize the heuris tic principle that it is a violation, unless there is a more specific overriding obligation. The un derlying motivation from legal reasoning is that criminals should have as little opportunities as possible to excuse themselves by claiming that their behavior was exceptional rather than crimi nal.
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THE LOGIC OF NORMS
Computer scientists use the logic of obligations, prohibi tions and permissions -called deontic logic -since the early eighties to represent and reason with legal knowledge (McCarty, 1994) , and recently it has been used to spec ify and analyze security issues about electronic networks (Conte and Falcone, 1997) , to represent norms in qualita tive decision theory (Pearl, 1993; Boutilier, 1994; Lang, 1996) and to represent rights, duties and commitments in multi-agent systems (van der Torre and Tan, 1999b) . A fur ther increase may be expected now recently developed pre scriptive deontic logics (Makinson, 1999; van der Torre and Tan, 1998a) Contrary-to-duty. The conceptual issue of the contrary to-duty paradoxes is how to proceed once a norm has been violated. Clearly this issue is of great practical relevance, because in most applications norms are vi olated frequently. In electronic contracting the con tracting parties usually do not want to consider a vi olation as a breach of contract, but simply as a dis ruption in the execution of the contract that has to be repaired.
Dilemma. The conceptual problem of the dilemma para doxes is to determine the coherence conditions of a normative system. For example, when drafting regu lations a coherence check indicates whether they have this desired property, or whether they should be fur ther modified.
In this paper we introduce a deontic update semantics for defeasible obligations and we show that the dynamic ap proach not only gives a better analysis of the traditional deontic problems, but it also gives a better analysis of the problems discussed in defeasible deontic logic. An exam ple of reasoning with defeasible obligations is that nor mally you have an obligation not to have a fence around your cottage, but this obligation is defeated in the excep tional circumstances when your cottage is next to a cliff (the examples in this paper are taken from the cottage hous ing regulations discussed in (Prakken and Sergo!, 1996) ).
Defeasible obligations can be overridden or cancelled by other, stronger obligations. It has been argued that more specific defeasible obligations are stronger than more gen eral defeasible obligations, and therefore override them in case of conflict (Horty, 1993; van der Torre, 1994; Asher and Bonevac, 1996; Morreau, 1996) . Unfortunately, the analysis of the specificity principle in logics of defeasible reasoning does not apply to defeasible deontic logic, be cause it may interfere with the violability of norms. In other words, the combination of reasoning about uncer tainty and contrary-to-duty reasoning leads to new com plications. This interference is illustrated by the following diagnostic problem.
1. There should not be a fence around the cottage.
2. If the cottage is next to a cliff, then there should be a white fence.
3. If there is a fence, tlien it should be white.
4. There is a white fence.
Is the fact 'there is a white fence' a violation or an ex ception? Obviously, this is a crucial question for legal knowledge-based systems. If the cottage is next to a cliff, then there should be a white fence according to the second line and the first obligation is cancelled. Moreover, if there is a fence, then there should be a white fence according to the third line, but the first obligation is not cancelled.
In this paper we formalize the heuristic principle that a defeasible obligation 'normally a ought to be (done)' to gether with the fact '•a is (done)' is a violation, unless there is a more specific overriding obligation. The underly ing motivation from legal reasoning is that criminals should have as little opportunities as possible to excuse themselves by claiming that their behavior was exceptional rather than criminal. In absence of a cliff you have to pay a penalty for having a fence, because in that case the first obligation is a violated actual obligation. The difference between the an tecedent of the second and third obligation is represented in the deontic states of the update semantics by two different orderings: the second gives rise to levels of exceptional ity (inspired by preference-based approaches to defeasible reasoning) and the third gives rise to levels of ideality (in spired by preference-based approaches to deontic reason ing). Summarizing, if there is a fence without a cliff, then the first obligation is overshadowed (by the third obliga tion) but not cancelled (by the second obligation). it is still in force -thus it is violated.
The defeasible obligations discussed in this paper should not be confused with prima facie obligations (Ross, 1930; Asher and Bonevac, 1996; Morreau, 1996; van der Torre and Tan, 1998b) . The typical example of prima facie obli· gations is that you have a prima facie obligation to keep your promises, but this prima facie obligation does not turn into an actual obligation when it leads to a disaster. The dis tinctive property is that the obligation 'there ought not to be a fence' is completely cancelled if your cottage is next to a cliff. However, if you have to break a promise to prevent a disaster, then the obligation to hold promises still holds as a prima facie obligation. Consequently, prima facie obliga tions have properties defeasible obligations considered in this paper do not have, such as reinstatement (van der Torre and 
DEFEASIBLE OBLIGATIONS INDUS
In this section we define prescriptive defeasible obligations in update semantics. The logic handles conflicts of hier archic obligations, which normally exist, but might be dy namically re-evaluated. Two characteristic properties of the logic are that obligations are overridden by more specific and conflicting obligations, and that unresolvable strong conflicts like 'p ought to be (done) and •p ought to be (done)' are 'inconsistent' in the sense that they derive all sentences of the deontic language.
We start with the basic definitions of Veltman's update se mantics (Veltman, 1996) . To define a deontic update se mantics for a deontic language L, one has to specify a set E Veltman explains what kind of semantic phenomena may successfully be analyzed in update semantics and he gives a detailed analysis of one such phenomenon: default rea soning. To define obligations in update semantics we have to define the deontic language, the deontic states and the deontic updates. The deontic language is a propositional language with the dyadic operator oblige( a I !3), read as 'normally a ought to be (done), if /3 is (done).'
Definition 2 (Deontic language) Let A be a set of atoms and L� a propositional language with A as its non-logical symbols. A string of symbols ¢ is a sentence of Lf if and only if either ¢ is a sentence of L� or there are two sen tences 1/JJ and 'lj;2 of L� such that¢= oblige(1/JJI1/J2). We write oblige 'lj; for oblige( 'lj; IT), where T stands for any tautology.
A deontic state is a possible worlds model written as u = (W, ::;I, ::;; N, V), where W is a set of worlds, �I is an ac cessibility relation for ideality, �N is an accessibility rela tion for normality, and V a valuation function for proposi tions at the worlds. For propositional¢ and world w E W we write rT, w f= <P if the classical interpretation repre sented by V ( w) satisfies ¢. We add the following features to these deontic states.
Explicit sub-state. We extend the possible worlds model with a second deontic state, which is a sub-state of the first one. The complete state is used for the context of justification and the sub-state is used for the context of deliberation, see (van der Torre and Tan, 1998a Full models. We define an update system for a specific A, W and V. In this paper, we assume that the deontic state contains a world for each interpretation of L� . If we want to represent background knowledge, then this assumption has to be dropped (van der Torre, 1994; Lang, 1996) .
Non-transitive ideality relation. We assume that the bi nary ideality relation is reflexive, but we do not as sume that it is transitive or total. There is a tech nical problem related to the formalization of condi tional obligations, discussed in (van der Torre and Tan, 1998a) . A consequence of this problem is that we cannot have transitivity for the relations in the dean tic states. We take the transitive closure of this re lation only when we determine the preferred worlds.
In (van der Torre and Tan, 1998a) we showed that a de antic state can be interpreted as a set of orderings, one for each factual sentence, instead of a unique ordering.
However, this technical problem is not relevant for the intuitions of our deontic update system and the inter pretation of most examples, and the deontic state can usually be identified with a single transitive ordering.
Definition 3 (Deontic state) Let Lf be a deontic lan guage. Assume a set of worlds W and a valuation function V for L� such that for every interpretation of L� there is at least one corresponding w E W. A deontic state is a tuple rT = (W, W*, �I, �N, V) consisting of the set of worlds W, a possibly empty subset w• <; W, a reflexive binary relation �I on W representing ideality, a transi tive, reflexive and totally connected binary relation �N on W representing normality, and the valuation function V.
The deontic updates are operations on the deontic states that either zoom in on the deontic state (for facts), or ereate ideality and normality levels (for obligations). The pre scriptive obligations have the dynamic component of creat ing a new deontic state. We first define the reduction of the ideality relation by an obligation. The following two def initions are extensions of definitions of the non-defeasible case in (van der Torre and Tan, 1998a) . In that case, to evaluate 'a ought to be (done) if /3 is (done)' the a A /3 and -,a II /3 worlds are compared. In a defeasible deontic logic, to evaluate the obligation 'normally, a ought to be (done) if /3 is (done),' only the most normal a A /3 and the most nor mal -,a A /3 worlds are compared in the ideality relation.
To facilitate the definitions we assume that the normality ordering has minimal elements; the generalization to infi nite descending chains is standard and straight forward (see e.g. (van der Torre and Tan, 1997)).
Definition 4 (Reduction) Let CT = (W, w·, �I, �N, V) be a deontic state, and let W1 and W2 be the set of respec tively the most normal..,a II /3 and a A /3 worlds ofW. The reduction ofrT by oblige(al/3), denoted by the symbol-, is defined as follows.
In the non-defeasible logic, the update rT[oblige(a I /3)] is the reduction of rT by oblige( a I /3) if afterwards the best /3 worlds are a worlds. Otherwise there is a con flict. For this definition of deontic updates we need a test whether the best (or preferred, or minimal) /3 worlds are a worlds. This test is analogous to the satisfaction test of a dyadic obligation in the Hansson-Lewis semantics (Hans son, 1971; Lewis, 1974) , and to the test whether a set of formulas preferentially entails a conclusion in preferential entailment (Shoham, 1988) . In the defeasible deontic logic, we test whether the best most normal a A /3 worlds are bet ter than the best most normal ..,a A /3 worlds. Note that this test is different from 'the best of the most normal /3 worlds are a worlds' (Makinson, 1993) Definition 5 (pref) Let CT = ( W, W*, �I,� N, V) be a de antic state, let W1 and W2 be the set of the most normal -,a A /3 and a II /3 worlds of W, and let �!3 be the transi tive closure of �I in Wt U W2, i.e. the smallest superset of �I such that for all /3 -worlds Wt, W2, Wa E Wt u w2 with Wt �!3 w2 and w2 �!3 wa we have Wt �!3 wa. We write pref(rT, /3) =a if and only if for all worlds W1 E Wt there is a world w2 E W2 such that w2 :::; ; !3 Wt and there is no W3 E W1 such that Wa �{3 W2.
If there is a conflict, then we introduce another exceptional ity level. In this exceptional level, the previous distinction in the ideality relation is repaired. 
A crucial notion of update systems is acceptance. The for mula c;l> is accepted in a deontic state a, written as a II-¢, if the update by c;1> results in the same state. In that case, the information conveyed by ¢ is already subsumed by a.
Acceptance is the counterpart of satisfaction in standard se mantics.
Definition 8 (Acceptance) Let a be a deontic state and¢ a formula of the deontic language Lf . a II-¢ if and only if a[c;i>] =a.
If an update is accepted, then the deontic state usually has a specific content. For example, it is easily checked that a fact a is accepted if all the worlds of W* f. 0 satisfy a, or a= 1.
The notion of acceptance is used to define notions of valid ity. An argument is I h valid if updating the minimal state 0 with the premises t/!I, ... , t/Jn, in that order, yields a deontic state in which the conclusion is accepted, and an argument is I f-. valid if all deontic states constructed by updating the minimal state 0 with the premises t/J1, ... , t/Jn in some order such that the premises are accepted, also accept the conclusion (van der Torre and Tan, 1998b) . Note that the order of the premises is only relevant for lh, not for I f-. . In the following section we illustrate that one of the fea tures of I f-. is that more specific and conflicting obliga tions are only accepted if they are later than more general ones. Hence, more specific and conflicting obligations cre ate exceptionality levels and override more general ones.
Moreover, we also illustrate how the logic deals with the diagnostic problem. The first two orders lead to a deontic state in which all wl\f worlds are preferred to ..., w 1\ f worlds, whereas the latter order leads to a state in which only the ..., c 1\ w 1\ f worlds are preferred to ..., c 1\ .,w 1\ f worlds. The latter order is represented in Figure 3 . In the figure we do not represent f 1\ ..., w worlds, because they are meaningless (they could be deleted from the model by using background knowledge, see (van der Torre, 1994; Lang, 1996) ). Moreover, with (w) we represent that w can either be true or false. As explained in (van der Torre and Tan, 1998b ) , to deal with the diagnostic problem we have to distinguish be-tween decision variables and parameters or events (Lang, 1996) (called controllable and uncontrollable propositions in (Boutilier, 1994) ). We therefor call c a parameter and w and f decision variables. There is a violation of a duty proper if and only if for every world that still can be real ized and that is most normal there is a better world which can no longer be realized and which is as least as normal, and that has the same truth values for the parameters.
First, consider the most normal w 1\ f state, i.e.
•c 1\ w 1\ f. Though this state is not the worst state (this is -.c/\ ..,w/\f), it is clear that this state is a violation state. The •c 1\ -,j state is preferred to it, it is as normal, and it has the same truth values for the parameter c. Moreover, consider c 1\ f.
The only world that has the same values for the parameters is c 1\ -,j, but these worlds are worse. Consequently c 1\ f is not a violation.
If we replace the second obligation by oblige(w 1\ f I c),
then the same argument goes through. However, now the ideality order of the c worlds is identical for each order of the premises below: c 1\ w 1\ f is preferred to c 1\ -,j, which is preferred to c 1\ -,w 1\ f. {oblige -,k, oblige(g/k), k}
given that gentle killing implies killing (I-g -t k), and' a certain man should go to the assistance of his neighbors,'
'if the man goes to their assistance, then he should tell them that he will come,' 'if the man does not go to the assistance, then he should not tell them he will come' and 'the man does not go' {oblige a, oblige(tia), oblige( -,ti..,a), •a}
In the following section we consider the latter example in the deontic update semantics extended with test operators.
TEST OPERATORS
In this section we formalize test operators in the dean tic update semantics. We write ideal( a I /3) for the test 'ideally, a is (done), if f3 is (done).' The interaction be tween oblige and ideal is analogous to the interaction be tween normally and presumably operators in Veltman's update semantics (Veltman, 1996) . Definition 10 (Deontic language, continued) Let A, Lf; and Lf be as defined in Definition 2. A string of symbols </J is a sentence of Lt if and only if either <P is a sentence of Lf or there are two sentences 1/J1, 1/J2 of Lf; such that either rjJ = ideai(1/Jti1/J2) or rjJ = ideai*(1/Jti1/J2). We write ideal'lj; for ideal('l/J/T) and ideal*'lj; for ideal*('l/JI T).
For the dynamic interpretation of a test we define it anal ogously to the test operator in dynamic logic, and to the might and presumably operators in Veltman's update se mantics (Veltman, 1996) . If the test is successful then the information conveyed by the test is already subsumed by the deontic state and the test update simply returns the state.
Otherwise the test update returns the absurd state.
Definition 11 (Deontic updates, continued) Let u = (W, w·' SI' SN' V) be a deontic state, and let pref be defined as pref, but with the worlds restricted to W* in stead of W . The update function u[¢] defined in Defini tion 7 is extended as follows.
•
The following contrary-to-duty paradox called Chisholm's paradox (Chisholm, 1963) illustrates how the two opera tors oblige and ideal are combined, and a fortiori how the two inference patterns strengthening of the antecedent and weakening of the consequent are combined. The contrary to-duty paradoxes are important benchmark problems of deontic logic. The examples also illustrate that the dean tic contrary-to-duty paradoxes can be modeled without any problems in DUS, and that the dynamic representation is in some respects more insightful than the static one.
Consider the sentences 'a certain man should go to the as sistance of his neighbors' (oblige a), 'if the man goes to their assistance, then he should tell them that he will come'
(oblige(t I a)), 'if the man does not go to the assistance, then he should not tell them he will come (oblige(-.ti".,a)) and 'the man does not go' (-.,a). Regardless of the order ing of the premises, the ideality relation in Figure 4 results.
There are no conflicts and therefor no exceptionality levels are introduced. All worlds are equivalent in the normality ordering.
[ 
In the context of justification (W) we have that in the ideal state the man tells his neighbors (t), oblige a, oblige(tl a), oblige(-.,tl -.,a), -.,a If-ideal t and in the context of deliberation (W* ) we have that in the ideal state the man does not tell his neighbors ( -.,t).
oblige a, oblige(tl a), oblige( -.,tl -.,a), -. ,a If-ideal* -. ,t
We finally show how strengthening of the antecedent and weakening of the consequent are combined. Strengthening of the antecedent is a property of oblige and weakening of the consequent is a property of ideal. We have:
oblige a, oblige(tl a), oblige(-.,tl -. ,a), -.,a If-oblige( a At) oblige a, oblige(tj a), oblige(-.,tl -.,a), ... ,a 1,1' oblige t oblige a, oblige(tl a), oblige( -.,tl -.,a), ...,a If-ideal (a At) oblige a, oblige(tl a), oblige(-.,tl ..., a), -.,a If-ideal t
The conclusion ideal tis derived from ideal(a At), which is derived from oblige( a At). See (Tan and van der Torre, 1996) for a further discussion on these two phases of dean tic reasoning.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The dynamic approach to formalizing norms (van der Torre and Tan, 1998a) follows a recent trend in dynamic seman tics (van Benthem, 1996) . In this paper it has been extended by a logic of prescriptive defeasible obligations, in which more specific obligations override more general ones. The specificity problem is solved by making more specific obli gations refer to exceptional circumstances.
Most of the deontic paradoxes concern obligations, and therefore most of the paradox driven research in deontic logic has focussed on obligations. However, in some appli cations -e.g. computer security -rights and permissions play a dominant role. In 'standard' approaches permission is defined as the absence of obligation. However, there are at least the following two problems with this so-called 'weak' permission.
Free choice. The conceptual problem of the free choice paradoxes is whether a permission for a disjunctive sentence implies the permission of each of its dis juncts (von Wright, 1968; Kamp, 7374 Tan, 1999b ) . These operators can be restricted to the most normal worlds, and then they can be used in the update semantics proposed in this paper.
In the update semantics for prima facie obligations (van der Torre and Tan, 1998b) a value (its strength) is associated with prima facie obligations (Ross, 1930) , such that they can override weaker obligations (van der Torre and It is well known that defeasible deontic logic is related to logics for qualitative decision theory (Pearl, 1993; Boutilier, 1994; van der Torre and Tan, 1999a) . In partic ular, prima facie obligations are related to logics of desires (qualitative abstractions of utilities) which can be overrid den by stronger desires (Tan and Pearl, 1994; Lang, 1996) .
The formal relation between obligations and desires is sub ject of present investigations.
